Industrial Policy and Democratic Corporate Governance: Perspectives from the BNDES Case

European Business Law Review, Volume 35, Issue 6, pp. 801-24.

24 Pages Posted: 6 Dec 2024 Last revised: 11 Oct 2024

See all articles by Arthur Sadami

Arthur Sadami

University of Sao Paulo - Faculdade de Direito; Getulio Vargas Foundation (FGV) - Fundação Getulio Vargas Law School at São Paulo

Lucas Víspico

University of São Paulo Law School; Harvard University - Harvard Law School

Mateus Bernardes

University of São Paulo (USP)

Date Written: October 11, 2024

Abstract

In the early twenty-first century, Brazil underwent a remarkable economic boom, primarily driven by the Brazilian National Bank of Economic and Social development (BNDES). this state-owned financial institution spearheaded a new industrial strategy, sponsoring domestic companies, such as Odebrecht and JBS, to their internationalisation. Nevertheless, this initial successful story took a dramatic turn over the years, the Brazilian national champions found themselves involved in corruption scandals, human rights violations and environmental damage, with BNDES indirectly funding these activities. this article seeks to discuss this crony capitalism arrangement, examining the role of corporate governance in safeguarding industrial policy from capture. We conclude by exploring how a democratic model of corporate governance could provide some insights for addressing this issue.

Note: “Reprinted from European Business Law Review, Volume 35, Issue 6, 2024, pp. 801-24, with permission of Kluwer Law International.”

Keywords: Business and Securities Law, development Planning and Policy, market design, Corruption, multinational Firms, Investment Banking, Government Policy and Regulation, Corporate Governance, Financing Policy

Suggested Citation

Sadami, Arthur and Víspico, Lucas and Bernardes, Mateus, Industrial Policy and Democratic Corporate Governance: Perspectives from the BNDES Case (October 11, 2024). European Business Law Review, Volume 35, Issue 6, pp. 801-24., Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4984461 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4984461

Arthur Sadami

University of Sao Paulo - Faculdade de Direito ( email )

Largo São Francisco, 95 Prédio Anexo
São Paulo, São Paulo 01005-010
Brazil

Getulio Vargas Foundation (FGV) - Fundação Getulio Vargas Law School at São Paulo ( email )

São Paulo
Brazil

Lucas Víspico (Contact Author)

University of São Paulo Law School ( email )

Rua Luciano Gualberto, 315
São Paulo, São Paulo 14800-901
Brazil

Harvard University - Harvard Law School ( email )

1563 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Mateus Bernardes

University of São Paulo (USP) ( email )

Av. Prof. Luciano Gualberto 380
Sao Paulo, 05508-010
Brazil

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