U.S.-Japan and U.S.-China Trade Conflict: Export Growth, Reciprocity, and the International Trading System

45 Pages Posted: 20 Apr 2016

See all articles by Chad P. Bown

Chad P. Bown

Peterson Institute for International Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Rachel McCulloch

Brandeis University - Department of Economics; Brandeis University - International Business School

Date Written: October 1, 2009

Abstract

First Japan and more recently China have pursued export-oriented growth strategies. While other Asian countries have done likewise, Japan and China are of particular interest because their economies are so large and the size of the associated bilateral trade imbalances with the United States so conspicuous. In this paper the authors focus on U.S. efforts to restore the reciprocal GATT/WTO market-access bargain in the face of such large imbalances and the significant spillovers to the international trading system. The paper highlights similarities and differences in the two cases. The authors describe U.S. attempts to reduce the bilateral imbalances through targeted trade policies intended to slow growth of U.S. imports from these countries or increase growth of U.S. exports to them. They then examine how these trade policy responses, as well as U.S. efforts to address what were perceived as underlying causes of the imbalances, influenced the evolution of the international trading system. Finally, the authors compare the macroeconomic conditions associated with the bilateral trade imbalances and their implications for the conclusions of the two episodes.

Keywords: Free Trade, Trade Law, Economic Theory & Research, Trade Policy, Currencies and Exchange Rates

Suggested Citation

Bown, Chad P. and McCulloch, Rachel, U.S.-Japan and U.S.-China Trade Conflict: Export Growth, Reciprocity, and the International Trading System (October 1, 2009). World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 5102, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1503781

Chad P. Bown (Contact Author)

Peterson Institute for International Economics ( email )

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Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

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Rachel McCulloch

Brandeis University - Department of Economics ( email )

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781-736-2245 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://people.brandeis.edu/~rmccullo/

Brandeis University - International Business School ( email )

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