Curation As Competition, Curation As Vice

Abstract

Scholars and regulators are in near-universal agreement that the digital platform economy is dominated by firms that benefit from strong network effects. This allows the largest firms to take advantage of exploitable users, siphoning off their personal data and exposing them to harmful or addicting content. We argue that the conventional model is mistaken. Network effects are critical early on, but as platforms mature, matching users to the right content at the right time is more important. If the platform does that well, users will be more engaged, creating a quality dimension on which platforms can (and do) compete. 

However, when platforms compete on the quality of their curation, the competitive pressure causes them to intensively collect and use personal data. Moreover, the algorithms that are designed to maximize user engagement are also believed to cause addiction, mental health problems, and political polarization. Curation is therefore simultaneously a source of competition and a source of vice. 

Policymakers usually assume that the competition, privacy, and consumer protection goals reinforce each other, so they pursue all of them at once. But in fact, these goals are in direct conflict with each other (not to mention the First Amendment). This Article provides a necessary correction so that scholars and regulators can make a cleareyed evaluation of the limits and tradeoffs of government interventions in the platform economy.

Keywords: Technology Law, Antitrust, Privacy, First Amendment, Free Speech, Social Media, Platforms, Innovation Policy, Addiction