Dynamic Games of Common-Property Resource Exploitation When Self-Image Matters

34 Pages Posted: 23 Oct 2019

See all articles by Ngo Van Long

Ngo Van Long

McGill University - Department of Economics; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Date Written: 2019

Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to model the influence of Kantian moral scruples in a dynamic environment. Our objectives are two-fold. Firstly, we investigate how a Nash equilibrium among agents who have moral scruples may ensure that the exploitation of a common property renewable resource is Pareto efficient at every point of time. Secondly, we outline a prototype model that shows, in an overlapping generation framework, how a community's sense of morality may evolve over time and identifies conditions under which the community may reach a steady state level of morality in which everyone is perfectly Kantian.

Keywords: tragedy of the commons, dynamic games, Nash equilibrium, self-image, categorical imperative

JEL Classification: C710, D620, D710

Suggested Citation

Van Long, Ngo, Dynamic Games of Common-Property Resource Exploitation When Self-Image Matters (2019). CESifo Working Paper No. 7880, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3473596 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3473596

Ngo Van Long (Contact Author)

McGill University - Department of Economics ( email )

855 Sherbrooke Street West
Montreal, QC H3A 2T7
Canada
514-398-4850 (Phone)
514-398-4938 (Fax)

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

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