Armed Groups in Conflict: Competition and Political Violence in Pakistan

73 Pages Posted: 23 Jun 2020

See all articles by Martin Gassebner

Martin Gassebner

ETH Zurich - KOF Swiss Economic Institute; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Paul Schaudt

University of St. Gallen

Melvin H. L. Wong

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Date Written: 2020

Abstract

This paper studies how an increase in the number of armed groups operating within an area affects the amount of organized political violence. We use plausible exogenous variation in the number of armed groups in Pakistan, by exploiting the split of a major group due to the natural death of its leader. Employing difference-in-difference and instrumental variable regressions on geocoded incident and fatality data allows us to derive a causal effect: more groups lead to more political violence. By combining different data sources and implementing a new approach to deal with potential double-counting, we provide a proxy for counter-insurgency efforts by the government. We show that the increase in violence is primarily driven by the armed groups and not by responses of the government.

Keywords: political violence, conflict, terrorism, armed groups, double-counting

JEL Classification: D740, F520, H560

Suggested Citation

Gassebner, Martin and Schaudt, Paul and L. Wong, Melvin H., Armed Groups in Conflict: Competition and Political Violence in Pakistan (2020). CESifo Working Paper No. 8372, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3633657 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3633657

Martin Gassebner (Contact Author)

ETH Zurich - KOF Swiss Economic Institute ( email )

Weinbergstrasse 35
Zurich, 8092
Switzerland

HOME PAGE: http://www.kof.ethz.ch/chair/

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute) ( email )

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

Paul Schaudt

University of St. Gallen ( email )

Bodanstrasse 8
SIAW-HSG
St.Gallen, 9000
Switzerland

HOME PAGE: http://paulschaudt.com

Melvin H. L. Wong

affiliation not provided to SSRN

No Address Available

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