The Political Scar of Epidemics

102 Pages Posted: 16 Apr 2021

See all articles by Barry Eichengreen

Barry Eichengreen

University of California, Berkeley; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Orkun Saka

City, University of London; London School of Economics; Systemic Risk Centre & STICERD; CESifo Network

Cevat Aksoy

University College London

Date Written: 2021

Abstract

What political legacy is bequeathed by national health crises such as epidemics? We show that epidemic exposure in an individual’s “impressionable years” (ages 18 to 25) has a persistent negative effect on confidence in political institutions and leaders. The effect is specific to the impressionable ages, observed only for political institutions and leaders, and does not carry over to other institutions and individuals with one key exception. That exception is strong negative effects on confidence in public health systems, suggesting that the loss of confidence in political institutions and leaders is associated with the (in)effectiveness of a government’s healthcare-related responses to past epidemics. We document this mechanism, showing that weak governments took longer to introduce policy interventions in response to the COVID-19 outbreak, and demonstrating that the loss of political trust is larger for individuals who experienced epidemics under weak governments. Finally, we report evidence suggesting that the epidemic-induced loss of political trust may discourage electoral participation in the long term.

JEL Classification: D720, F500, I190

Suggested Citation

Eichengreen, Barry and Saka, Orkun and Aksoy, Cevat, The Political Scar of Epidemics (2021). CESifo Working Paper No. 9013, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3830218 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3830218

Barry Eichengreen (Contact Author)

University of California, Berkeley ( email )

310 Barrows Hall
Berkeley, CA 94720
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National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )

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Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) ( email )

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Orkun Saka

City, University of London ( email )

Northampton Square
London, EC1V OHB
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London School of Economics

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London, WC2A 2AE
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Systemic Risk Centre & STICERD

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CESifo Network

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Cevat Aksoy

University College London ( email )

Gower Street
London, WC1E 6BT
United Kingdom

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