Conditional Dominance, Rationalizability, and Game Forms
UCSD Economics Discussion Paper 97-16
35 Pages Posted: 3 Apr 1998
Date Written: July 1997
Abstract
We propose a notion of conditional dominance for games whose representations designate information sets. We prove that iterated conditional dominance is equivalent to extensive form rationalizability. We also conduct a general analysis of these concepts, yielding new insights on rationalizability and on the equivalence of solutions when applied to different representations of a game.
JEL Classification: C72
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Shimoji, Makoto and Watson, Joel, Conditional Dominance, Rationalizability, and Game Forms (July 1997). UCSD Economics Discussion Paper 97-16, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=73448 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.73448
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