Information Disclosure and Voluntary Contributions to Public Goods

University of Michigan Business School Working Paper No. 97-2

46 Pages Posted: 22 Apr 1999

See all articles by Siew Hong Teoh

Siew Hong Teoh

UCLA Anderson School of Management

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Abstract

This paper analyzes the effect of information generation and disclosure upon free riding and on the likelihood that cooperative efforts collapse in a public goods game. The model shows that the prospect of greater disclosure can make all individuals worse off ex ante by reducing expected contributions to the public good. Conditions under which disclosure becomes either more or less desirable are derived as a function of the number of individual contributors. Regulation or competitive problems that increase direct costs of disclosure may on average increase the provision of public goods and improve welfare. The desirability of disclosure in the contexts of collective political action, debt renegotiation, and production in teams are discussed.

JEL Classification: H41

Suggested Citation

Teoh, Siew Hong, Information Disclosure and Voluntary Contributions to Public Goods. University of Michigan Business School Working Paper No. 97-2, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=160266 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.160266

Siew Hong Teoh (Contact Author)

UCLA Anderson School of Management ( email )

110 Westwood Plaza
Los Angeles, CA 90095-1481
United States

HOME PAGE: http://www.anderson.ucla.edu/faculty-and-research/accounting/faculty/teoh