Auctions and Posted Prices: Selling Treasury Bills

Center for Economic Studies Working Paper No. CES19599

30 Pages Posted: 5 Jul 1999

See all articles by Patrick J. G. Van Cayseele

Patrick J. G. Van Cayseele

KU Leuven - Department of Economics

Dave Furth

Universiteit van Amsterdam

Date Written: May 19, 1999

Abstract

In many countries, treasury bills are sold using an auction mechanism. In addition, the treasury also offers the bills for sale after the auction, by posting a price equal to the winning bid in de preceeding auction. Only some players (typically market makers) may buy at this price, and only up to a fraction of the volume that is sold in the auction. At all times, these market makers keep the market for treasury bills liquid by quoting bid and ask prices at which they are willing to enter into a trade. We show that particular conditions exist where the treasury benefits from using a combination of auctions and posted prices, at the same time explaining some stylized facts in the empirical literature on treasury bill auctions.

JEL Classification: D44, G10, G18

Suggested Citation

Van Cayseele, Patrick G. J. and Furth, Dave, Auctions and Posted Prices: Selling Treasury Bills (May 19, 1999). Center for Economic Studies Working Paper No. CES19599, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=165334 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.165334

Patrick G. J. Van Cayseele (Contact Author)

KU Leuven - Department of Economics ( email )

Leuven, B-3000
Belgium
+32-16-326830 (Phone)
+32-16-326796 (Fax)

Dave Furth

Universiteit van Amsterdam

Faculteit der Rechtsgeleerdheid
Amsterdam 1018 WB
Netherlands