Tougher Educational Exam Leading to Worse Selection

26 Pages Posted: 15 Dec 2011

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: 2011

Abstract

A parallel of education with transformative processes in standard markets suggest that a more severe control of the quality of the output will improve the overall quality of the education. This paper shows a somehow counterintuitive result: an increase in the exam diffculty may reduce the average quality (productivity) of selected individuals. Since the exam does not verify all skills, when its standard rises, candidates with relatively low skills emphasized in the test and high skills demanded in the job may no longer qualify. Hence, an increase in the testing standard may be counterproductive. One implication is that policies should emphasize alignment between the skills tested and those required in the actual jobs, rather than increase exams' diffculty.

Keywords: school standard, signaling model, cognitive skill, noncognitive skill

JEL Classification: I2, J24

Suggested Citation

de Carvalho Andrade, Eduardo and de Castro, Luciano I., Tougher Educational Exam Leading to Worse Selection (2011). Economics: The Open-Access, Open-Assessment E-Journal, Vol. 5, 2011, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1972788 or http://dx.doi.org/10.5018/economics-ejournal.ja.2011-17

Eduardo De Carvalho Andrade (Contact Author)

affiliation not provided to SSRN

No Address Available

Luciano I. De Castro

Tippie College of Business ( email )

108 Pappajohn Building
Iowa City, IA 52242
United States

HOME PAGE: http://https://lucianodecastro.net/

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