An Economic Analysis of the Indian Judicial System

19 Pages Posted: 25 Jul 2007

See all articles by Gaurav Raizada

Gaurav Raizada

Indian Institute of Management, Ahmedabad

Deepali sehgal

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Kunal H Desai

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Anup Chandra Gupta

affiliation not provided to SSRN

CNV Kamal

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Date Written: September 25, 2005

Abstract

This is an attempt to model the Indian judicial system and analyse the social benefits and costs incurred as a result. Initially a framework has been developed. Then an attempt has been made to establish relationships between the chosen factors affecting the system. This is followed by a regression analysis involving all other factors in order to determine the demand and supply equations. A forecasting model is also being then presented in order to determine future trends of the factors. The micro economic analysis is concluded by a cost benefit analysis of increasing the number of judges for the government. Finally, we conclude the paper by making some recommendations based on our analysis and otherwise on the various measures that can be possibly taken in order to improve the status of our judicial system.

Keywords: Indian, judiciary, costs, benefits, microeconomic, economic

JEL Classification: B25, C50, C81, N45, D63, D61, D73, K00

Suggested Citation

Raizada, Gaurav and sehgal, Deepali and Desai, Kunal H and Gupta, Anup Chandra and Kamal, CNV, An Economic Analysis of the Indian Judicial System (September 25, 2005). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1002670 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1002670

Gaurav Raizada (Contact Author)

Indian Institute of Management, Ahmedabad ( email )

Vastrapur
Ahmedabad, Gujarat 380015
India

Deepali Sehgal

affiliation not provided to SSRN ( email )

No Address Available

Kunal H Desai

affiliation not provided to SSRN ( email )

No Address Available

Anup Chandra Gupta

affiliation not provided to SSRN ( email )

No Address Available

CNV Kamal

affiliation not provided to SSRN ( email )

No Address Available

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