Democracy, Transparency and the Apparent Demise of the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe

U of Melbourne Legal Studies Research Paper No. 268

Cambridge Yearbook on European Legal Studies, 2006

33 Pages Posted: 16 Oct 2007

See all articles by Cheryl Saunders

Cheryl Saunders

University of Melbourne - Law School

Abstract

The failure of any constitution-making process is deeply disappointing for some and a source of satisfaction for others. The satisfaction of the latter may be short, or at least not long, lived, however, if it subsequently turns out that the changes were necessary, or even demonstrably useful. Initial failure in a constitutional project is relatively common, for reasons that range from the difficulty of the process to the novelty and perceived significance of the issues at stake. Experience suggests, however, that, at least where the rationale for the constitutional proposals was sufficiently soundly based, failure may not be the end of the story. It follows that it makes sense to take stock after such an event: to identify what is lost, that was of value; to determine what, if anything, might be improved, if another constitutional moment presents itself; and to consider whether constitutionalisation should be attempted again, or whether other mechanisms can be used instead.

Keywords: democracy, transparency, treaty, Europe, European constitution

JEL Classification: K33

Suggested Citation

Saunders, Cheryl Anne, Democracy, Transparency and the Apparent Demise of the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe. U of Melbourne Legal Studies Research Paper No. 268, Cambridge Yearbook on European Legal Studies, 2006, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1021643

Cheryl Anne Saunders (Contact Author)

University of Melbourne - Law School ( email )

Centre for Comparative Constitutional Studies 723 Swanston Street (2nd Floor)
Parkville, Victoria 3010
Australia
61 3 8344 0753 (Phone)
61 3 8344 9374 (Fax)

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