Heterogenous Preferences and Equilibrium Trading Volume

38 Pages Posted: 19 Apr 2005 Last revised: 28 Oct 2008

See all articles by Tony Berrada

Tony Berrada

University of Geneva - Geneva Finance Research Institute (GFRI); Swiss Finance Institute

Julien Hugonnier

École Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Marcel Rindisbacher

Boston University - Questrom School of Business

Date Written: January 1, 2006

Abstract

The classic Lucas asset pricing model with complete markets stresses aggregate risk and, hence, fails to investigate the impact of agents heterogeneity on the dynamics of the equilibrium quantities and measures of trading volume. In this paper, we investigate under what conditions non-informational heterogeneity, i.e., differences in preferences and endowments, leads to non trivial trading volume in equilibrium. Our main result comes in form of a non-informational no trade theorem which provides necessary and sufficient conditions for zero trading volume in a dynamically efficient, continuous time Lucas market model with multiple goods and securities.

Keywords: General equilibrium, trading volume, heterogenous agents, multiple goods, incomplete markets, no-trade theorem

JEL Classification: D51, D52, G11, G12

Suggested Citation

Berrada, Tony and Hugonnier, Julien and Rindisbacher, Marcel, Heterogenous Preferences and Equilibrium Trading Volume (January 1, 2006). Swiss Finance Institute Research Paper, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=697863 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.697863

Tony Berrada (Contact Author)

University of Geneva - Geneva Finance Research Institute (GFRI) ( email )

40 Boulevard du Pont d'Arve
Geneva 4, Geneva 1211
Switzerland

Swiss Finance Institute

c/o University of Geneva
40, Bd du Pont-d'Arve
CH-1211 Geneva 4
Switzerland

Julien Hugonnier

École Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne ( email )

Quartier UNIL Dorigny
Extranef
Lausanne, CH-1015
Switzerland

HOME PAGE: http://https://www.epfl.ch/labs/sfi-jh/

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) ( email )

London
United Kingdom

Marcel Rindisbacher

Boston University - Questrom School of Business ( email )

595 Commonwealth Avenue
Boston, MA MA 02215
United States

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