Allies and Adversaries: The Roles of Appointees in Administrative Policymaking under Separation of Powers

51 Pages Posted: 13 Jun 2008

See all articles by Patrick L. Warren

Patrick L. Warren

Clemson University - John E. Walker Department of Economics

Date Written: April 9, 2008

Abstract

In a system of divided power, public sector agencies are an important front in the day-to-day battle for political supremacy between the executive and the legislature. The executive's key agents in this conflict are his appointees, who are observed playing two broad roles: allies, where they work to help Congress implement policy and adversaries, where they fight with Congress to shift policy strongly in the executive's direction. This paper studies how these two roles arise and what implications they have for the interaction of Congress and the executive in administrative policymaking. Thereby, it highlights how intrinsically motivated bureaucrats combined with hierarchical control affect the ability of the political principals to control the execution of policy. Furthermore, I explore how this interaction shifts under alternative institutional forms, and how it leads appointees to "marry the natives." The model makes several predictions concerning Congressional oversight of bureaucratic agencies. These predictions are broadly supported by an empirical analysis of audit reports released by the Government Accountability Office.

Keywords: Bureaucracy, Appointment, Separation of Powers, Oversight, Hierarchy

JEL Classification: D23, D72, D73, D78

Suggested Citation

Warren, Patrick L., Allies and Adversaries: The Roles of Appointees in Administrative Policymaking under Separation of Powers (April 9, 2008). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1144112 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1144112

Patrick L. Warren (Contact Author)

Clemson University - John E. Walker Department of Economics ( email )

Clemson, SC 29634
United States

Do you have negative results from your research you’d like to share?

Paper statistics

Downloads
94
Abstract Views
762
Rank
499,092
PlumX Metrics