Pre-Bankruptcy Dynamics and Unsecured Debt

41 Pages Posted: 22 Apr 2008 Last revised: 3 Sep 2008

See all articles by Koen J. L. Schoors

Koen J. L. Schoors

Ghent University - Centre for Russian International Socio-Political and Economic Studies (CERISE); Ghent University - Department of General Economics

Peter Coussement

Ghent University - Financial Law Institute

Bart Leyman

Ghent University - Faculty of Economics and Business Administration

Date Written: September 2, 2008

Abstract

We analyze the impact of pre-bankruptcy dynamics on the levels of unsecured debt at the start of bankruptcy procedures, using a unique sample of small distressed firms that reorganize under Belgian court-supervision. These firms rely on trade credit if banks withdraw their lending prior to bankruptcy. Apparently trade creditors are willing to finance a distressed firm's shortfall in cash flow during this period. They also accumulate unpaid taxes and social contributions in the running-up to bankruptcy reorganization, pushing the government administration in the unintended role of lender of last resort. These findings suggest that pre-bankruptcy dynamics strongly affect the debt structure at the moment of initiation of the procedure and in this way the ultimate outcome of the restructuring process.

Keywords: court-supervised reorganization, bankruptcy, pecking order, trade creditor theory, lender of last resort

JEL Classification: G33, G38, K20

Suggested Citation

Schoors, Koen J. L. and Coussement, Peter and Leyman, Bart, Pre-Bankruptcy Dynamics and Unsecured Debt (September 2, 2008). 3rd Annual Conference on Empirical Legal Studies Papers, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1123864 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1123864

Koen J. L. Schoors

Ghent University - Centre for Russian International Socio-Political and Economic Studies (CERISE) ( email )

Tweekerkenstraat 2
Ghent, 9000
Belgium
+32 9 264 34 78 (Phone)
+32 9 265 35 99 (Fax)

Ghent University - Department of General Economics ( email )

Tweekerkenstraat 2
Ghent, 9000
Belgium
+32 9 264 34 78 (Phone)
+32 9 264 35 99 (Fax)

Peter Coussement

Ghent University - Financial Law Institute ( email )

Universiteitstraat 4
Ghent, B-9000
Belgium
+322686856 (Phone)
+3292686855 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.law.ugent.be/fli

Bart Leyman (Contact Author)

Ghent University - Faculty of Economics and Business Administration ( email )

Ghent, B-9000
Belgium

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