Preemption Games: Theory and Experiment
44 Pages Posted: 13 Oct 2008
Date Written: March 6, 2008
Abstract
Several investors face an irreversible investment opportunity whose value V is governed by Brownian motion with upward drift and random expiration. The first investor i to seize the opportunity before expiration receives the current V less a privately known cost Ci; the other investors receive nothing. We characterize Bayesian Nash Equilibrium (BNE) for this game, extending previously known results.
We also report a laboratory experiment with 72 subjects randomly matched into 600 triopolies. As predicted in BNE, subjects in triopolies invested at lower values than in monopolies, changes in Brownian parameters significantly altered investment values in monopoly but not in triopoly; and the lowest cost investor in a triopoly usually preempted the others. Evidence was mixed on other BNE predictions, e.g., whether higher cost brings smaller markups. Overall, subjects' earnings came rather close to the BNE prediction.
Keywords: Preemption, Incomplete Information, Irreversible Investment, Laboratory Experiment
JEL Classification: C73, C92, D82, G13
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
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