Dworkin on the Value of Integrity

Deakin Law Review, Vol. 12, No. 1, pp. 167-180, 2007

University of Queensland TC Beirne School of Law Research Paper No. 08-14

15 Pages Posted: 20 Oct 2008

See all articles by Jonathan Crowe

Jonathan Crowe

University of Southern Queensland - School of Law and Justice

Date Written: October 20, 2008

Abstract

This article explores and critiques Ronald Dworkin's arguments on the value of integrity in law. Dworkin presents integrity in both legislation and adjudication as holding inherent political value. I defend an alternative theory of the value of integrity, according to which integrity holds instrumental value as part of a legal framework that seeks to realise a particular set of basic values taken to underpin the legal system as a whole. It is argued that this instrumental-value theory explains the value of integrity more satisfactorily than Dworkin's inherent-value account. The article concludes with a discussion of Dworkin's 'one right answer thesis'. Although the proposed theory of integrity does not support a strong version of Dworkin's thesis, it does suggest that there will be a single correct answer to legal questions more often than for normative deliberation generally.

Keywords: Integrity, law and ethics, legal reasoning, basic values, Dworkin, Finnis

Suggested Citation

Crowe, Jonathan, Dworkin on the Value of Integrity (October 20, 2008). Deakin Law Review, Vol. 12, No. 1, pp. 167-180, 2007, University of Queensland TC Beirne School of Law Research Paper No. 08-14, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1287002 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1287002

Jonathan Crowe (Contact Author)

University of Southern Queensland - School of Law and Justice ( email )

West Street
Toowoomba, Queensland 4350
Australia

HOME PAGE: http://jonathancrowe.org/

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