International Reserves Holdings with Sovereign Risk and Costly Tax Collection

23 Pages Posted: 23 Oct 2008

See all articles by Joshua Aizenman

Joshua Aizenman

University of Southern California - Department of Economics

Nancy Peregrim Marion

Dartmouth College - Department of Economics

Date Written: July 1, 2004

Abstract

We derive a precautionary demand for international reserves in the presence of sovereign risk and show that political-economy considerations modify the optimal level of reserve holdings. A greater chance of opportunistic behaviour by future policy makers and political corruption reduce the demand for international reserves and increase external borrowing. We provide evidence to support these findings. Consequently, the debt-to-reserves ratio may be less useful as a vulnerability indicator. A version of the Lucas Critique suggests that if a high debt-to-reserves ratio is a symptom of opportunistic behaviour, a policy recommendation to increase international reserve holdings may be welfare-reducing.

Keywords: International, reserves, holdings

JEL Classification: F14, J37

Suggested Citation

Aizenman, Joshua and Marion, Nancy P., International Reserves Holdings with Sovereign Risk and Costly Tax Collection (July 1, 2004). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1288138 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1288138

Joshua Aizenman (Contact Author)

University of Southern California - Department of Economics ( email )

3620 South Vermont Ave. Kaprielian (KAP) Hall 300
Los Angeles, CA 90089
United States

Nancy P. Marion

Dartmouth College - Department of Economics ( email )

Hanover, NH 03755
United States
(603) 646-2511 (Phone)

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