New Strategies for Enforcement of the Access to Information Act

Queen's Law Journal, Vol. 27, pp. 647-683, Winter 2002

36 Pages Posted: 2 Dec 2008

See all articles by Alasdair S. Roberts

Alasdair S. Roberts

University of Massachusetts Amherst - School of Public Policy

Date Written: May 13, 2002

Abstract

In the last eight years the Chr¿tien government has taken several steps that have weakened the Access to Information Act, the federal law that guarantees the rights of citizens to access information held by the government. These changes compel a reconsideration of the Act's enforcement strategy - a strategy that is common to many older right-to-information laws - which is centered principally on the resolution of complaints about individual cases of non-compliance and gives the final authority to resolve complaints to the Federal Court of Canada rather than the Information Commissioner. The author argues that a better strategy would put greater emphasis on the analysis and publication of data on overall compliance patterns; give the Commissioner more effective tools for remedying systemic non-compliance; and give the Commissioner the authority to issue orders to resolve complaints about specific cases of non-compliance. These steps would help to repair frayed relationships between the Office of the Information Commissioner and federal departments, and would improve overall compliance with the requirements of the Act.

Keywords: access to information, right to information, freedom of information, enforcement, compliance, Canada

Suggested Citation

Roberts, Alasdair S., New Strategies for Enforcement of the Access to Information Act (May 13, 2002). Queen's Law Journal, Vol. 27, pp. 647-683, Winter 2002, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1308893

Alasdair S. Roberts (Contact Author)

University of Massachusetts Amherst - School of Public Policy ( email )

Thompson Hall
Amherst, MA 01003
United States
6175999029 (Phone)

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