The Dysfunctional Relationship between Abstention and Supplemental Jurisdiction

Abstract

This Article examines the relationship between a federal court's power to abstain from exercising its jurisdiction pursuant to judicially-created abstention doctrines and its power to decline to exercise its jurisdiction over supplemental claims under 28 U.S.C. section 1367(c).

Although "federal courts have a strict duty to exercise the jurisdiction that is conferred upon them by Congress," "[t]his duty is not . . . absolute." They may abstain or "decline to exercise their jurisdiction in otherwise exceptional circumstances, where denying a federal forum would clearly serve an important countervailing interest." Similarly, under section 1367(c), federal courts may decline to exercise their jurisdiction over claims within their supplemental jurisdiction when "(1) the claim raises a novel or complex issue of State law, (2) the claim substantially predominates over the claim or claims over which the district court has original jurisdiction, (3) the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction, or (4) in exceptional circumstances, there are other compelling reasons for declining jurisdiction."

Despite the similarity in the language of abstention and section 1367(c), neither the statute nor its legislative history mention, let alone discuss, the relationship between the two doctrines. The United States Supreme Court has abstractly suggested that some relationship exists between abstention and section 1367(c), but to date has not elaborated on the specific nature of that relationship. Although scholars have broached the subject, they have done so only in passing and have offered various unsatisfactory and incomplete explanations of the relationship between abstention and section 1367(c). Most commonly, scholars have argued either that section 1367(c)(1) and (2) codify Pullman and Burford abstention respectively, or that section 1367(c)(4) alone incorporates the abstention doctrines. Like scholars, lower federal courts have taken a variety of approaches to the issue. No scholar or court, however, has examined the relationship between abstention and section 1367(c) in any depth. This Article attempts to do so.

Part II of this Article explains the pertinent abstention doctrines and history of supplemental jurisdiction. Part III discusses the primary positions taken by scholars, the Supreme Court, and the lower federal courts on the relationship between abstention and the declination of supplemental jurisdiction and identifies the problems with each approach. Part III argues that, in light of ¿ 1367(c)'s plain language and its legislative history, as well as the justifications for both abstention and section 1367(c), it is implausible to conclude that ¿ 1367(c)(1) and (2) codify Pullman and Burford abstention. Furthermore, Section III argues that while it may be possible to conclude that section 1367(c)(4) incorporates the abstention doctrines, this conclusion requires recognition by courts, scholars and lawyers that section 1367(c) significantly altered the abstention doctrines, at least as they apply to cases involving supplemental claims. Part IV argues that in order to properly synchronize section 1367(c) with the abstention doctrines, the supplemental jurisdiction statute must be amended. Part IV then proposes specific amendments to 28 U.S.C. section 1367.

Keywords: abstention, supplemental jurisdiction, 1367(c), certification