Adaptationist Punishment in Humans
14 Pages Posted: 26 Mar 2009 Last revised: 18 May 2010
Date Written: March 26, 2009
Abstract
Immanuel Kant, Adam Smith, Charles Darwin, George Williams, and Stephen J. Gould, among others, have pointed out that observing that a certain behavior causes a certain effect does not itself license the inference that the effect was the result of intent or design to bring about that effect. Compliance with duty might not reflect the action of conscience, gains in trade might not be due to the benevolence of traders, and fox paws might not be designed to make tracks in snow. Similarly, when person A inflicts costs on person B and, in so doing, generates benefits to C, D, and E (or the group to which A through E belong, in aggregate), the inference that the imposition of costs on B by A is by virtue of intent or design to bring about these welfare gains is not logically licensed. In short, labeling punishment altruistic because it has the effect of delivering benefits to some is inconsistent with centuries of conceptual gains in philosophy, economics, and biology. Understanding the ultimate cause and proximate design of the mechanisms that cause people to punish is likely to be crucial to understanding how punishment might help solve collective action problems.
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