Patterns of Power: Bargaining and Incentives in Two-Person Games

17 Pages Posted: 6 Apr 2009

See all articles by Geoffrey M. Heal

Geoffrey M. Heal

Columbia University - Columbia Business School, Finance; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Graciela Chichilnisky

Columbia University

Date Written: 1984

Abstract

We introduce the concept of a strategic dictator and use it to analyze patterns of power in two-pperson games that arise naturally in bargaining, arbitration, and incentive problems, a strategic dictator is an agent who has the power to ensure that at Nash equilibrium outcome is his or her preferred outcome. but who may have to lie in order to do this. We discuss applications of our analysis to Stackelberg and Cournot Duopolists. to bargaining situations, and to the existence of appropriate incentive systems.

Suggested Citation

Heal, Geoffrey M. and Chichilnisky, Graciela, Patterns of Power: Bargaining and Incentives in Two-Person Games (1984). Journal of Public Economics, Vol. 23, 1984, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1370676

Geoffrey M. Heal

Columbia University - Columbia Business School, Finance ( email )

3022 Broadway
New York, NY 10027
United States
212-854-6459 (Phone)
212-316-9219 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.gsb.columbia.edu/faculty/gheal/

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

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Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Graciela Chichilnisky (Contact Author)

Columbia University ( email )

3022 Broadway
New York, NY 10027
United States
212 678 1148 (Phone)
212 678 0405 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.chilchilnisky.com

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