Does the Performance of Non-Audit Services by Auditors Impair Independence? Evidence from Firms Post-Service Performance

38 Pages Posted: 23 Apr 2009

See all articles by Thomas Lau

Thomas Lau

The Hong Kong Polytechnic University

Yaw M. Mensah

Rutgers Business School - Newark & New Brunswick

Date Written: April 19, 2009

Abstract

This study examines whether the provision of non-audit services by a firm’s own auditors provides value to the firm. We examine the future return on assets and sales growth as a function of the expenditures by the client firms on non-audit services, reasoning that if such payments are intended primarily to impair auditor independence, no association with future firm performance should be detected. Our findings show that, in fact, the payments to auditors for non-audit services are positively related to the one-period ahead sales growth. We interpret these findings as suggesting that firms do obtain value for their expenditures on non-audit services provided by their auditors. Thus, even if auditor independence is compromised by such hiring, the value obtained by the client firms for their non-audit services may justify their hiring.

Keywords: Non-audit services, firm performance, auditor independence, governance

JEL Classification: L21, L84, M49

Suggested Citation

LAU, Thomas Sing-Chiu and Mensah, Yaw M., Does the Performance of Non-Audit Services by Auditors Impair Independence? Evidence from Firms Post-Service Performance (April 19, 2009). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1392048 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1392048

Thomas Sing-Chiu LAU (Contact Author)

The Hong Kong Polytechnic University ( email )

M715, Li Ka Shing Tower
Hung Hom, Kowloon, Kowloon
Hong Kong
852 2766 4396 (Phone)
852 2330 9845 (Fax)

Yaw M. Mensah

Rutgers Business School - Newark & New Brunswick ( email )

100 Rockafeller Road
Piscataway, NJ 08854
United States
848.445.4369 (Phone)
732.445.0351 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://business.rutgers.edu

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