The Theory of Regulatory Competition and Competition Law

25 Pages Posted: 20 Apr 2009

See all articles by Wolfgang Kerber

Wolfgang Kerber

University of Marburg - School of Business & Economics

Date Written: April 20, 2009

Abstract

The governance of competition on global markets is an open policy question (lack of international competition policy). In this paper, it is analyzed to what extent different types of regulatory competition, which in other regulatory contexts (as, e.g., corporate law) can be beneficial, might also be a solution in competition law (instead of seeking harmonisation and centralization). In a first step, it is demonstrated why regulatory competition of competition laws can only be beneficial under very spe-cial circumstances and should therefore be generally avoided. However, yardstick competition as one specific type of regulatory competition, which promotes innovation and mutual learning in regard to competition law rules and practices, might be so valuable that a fairly decentralised multi-level system of competition laws might be recommended. Therefore, in a second step, the basic elements of a global multi-level system of competition laws are presented, which allows for decentralised experimen-tation with new possibilities for protecting competition (laboratory federalism). Some conclusions are drawn for the International Competition Network (ICN).

Keywords: international competition policy, regulatory competition, competition law, antitrust law

JEL Classification: F02, F13, H77, K21

Suggested Citation

Kerber, Wolfgang, The Theory of Regulatory Competition and Competition Law (April 20, 2009). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1392163 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1392163

Wolfgang Kerber (Contact Author)

University of Marburg - School of Business & Economics ( email )

Am Plan 2
Marburg, D-35037
Germany
+49 6421 2823921 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://www.uni-marburg.de/en/fb02/research-groups/economics/wipol/prof-wolfgang-kerber

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