Corporate Governance Dynamics and Tax Compliance

International Trade and Business Law Review, 2009

U of Michigan Law & Economics, SJD Working Paper No. 1361895

27 Pages Posted: 19 Mar 2009 Last revised: 29 Jun 2009

See all articles by Nicola Sartori

Nicola Sartori

University of Michigan at Ann Arbor; University of Milano-Bicocca - School of Law

Abstract

This paper addresses the effects that corporate governance dynamics may have on corporate tax compliance. The peculiarity of the corporate governance dynamics for a corporation gives rise to a new challenge, the core of which is the investigation and analysis how corporate governance rules can be seen as tax enforcement tools.

This topic is part of a general research, related to the interactions between corporate governance and taxation. This research critically investigates such bilateral relationship limiting the analysis to the theoretical effects that corporate governance rules and principles may have on corporate tax behaviors. Therefore, the purpose of the research is to analyze the connection between corporate governance and strategic tax behaviors, investigating how corporate governance rules can reach a higher level of corporate compliance with the tax system.

The research agenda requires (i) to offer an overview of the general relationship between corporate governance and taxation (chapter 1), (ii) to define corporate governance principles (chapter 2), (iii) to critically investigate possible corporate governance designs that aim to decrease corporate tax compliance and influence corporations' tax attitudes (chapter 3), and (v) to conclude that good corporate governance dynamics have a positive impact on tax compliance discouraging corporations from engaging in aggressive tax planning strategies.

Keywords: taxation, corporate governance, tax compliance, transparency

JEL Classification: K34

Suggested Citation

Sartori, Nicola and Sartori, Nicola, Corporate Governance Dynamics and Tax Compliance. International Trade and Business Law Review, 2009, U of Michigan Law & Economics, SJD Working Paper No. 1361895, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1361895

Nicola Sartori (Contact Author)

University of Milano-Bicocca - School of Law ( email )

Piazza dell'Ateneo Nuovo, 1
20126 Milano
Italy

University of Michigan at Ann Arbor ( email )

500 S. State Street
Ann Arbor, MI 48109
United States

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