Reforming Knowledge? A Socio-Legal Critique of the Legal Education Reforms in Japan

Drexel Law Review, Vol. 1, p. 3, 2009

Cornell Legal Studies Research Paper No. 09-005

49 Pages Posted: 26 Mar 2009 Last revised: 25 May 2009

See all articles by Annelise Riles

Annelise Riles

Northwestern Law School; Buffett Institute of Global Affairs

Takashi Uchida

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Date Written: March 23, 2009

Abstract

This article critiques the current Japanese legal education reforms, modeled largely on the United States, by proposing a socio-technical framework for analyzing the distribution of legal expertise in a given society. On one side of the spectrum is the "monocentric" model of legal expertise, in which expertise is monopolized by the profession and legal literacy is low. On the other side of the spectrum is the "polycentric" model of legal expertise, in which a range of social and institutional actors share responsibility for legal expertise and legal literacy is high. If the U.S. is a more monocentric system, the Japanese system has historically been more polycentric. The article evaluates the strengths and weaknesses of the two kinds of systems, focusing on the role of "legal knowledge workers" who are not professional lawyers in Japan. It concludes that although each system has strengths and weaknesses, a polycentric model of legal knowledge distribution is ultimately more economically efficient and better suited to the goals of a liberal democratic society than a monocentric model. For this reason, the rush to emulate the American system in current Japanese reforms is seriously flawed.

Suggested Citation

Riles, Annelise and Riles, Annelise and Uchida, Takashi, Reforming Knowledge? A Socio-Legal Critique of the Legal Education Reforms in Japan (March 23, 2009). Drexel Law Review, Vol. 1, p. 3, 2009, Cornell Legal Studies Research Paper No. 09-005, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1367068

Annelise Riles (Contact Author)

Northwestern Law School ( email )

375 E. Chicago Ave
Chicago, IL 60611
United States
(312) 503-1018 (Phone)
(312) 988-6579 (Fax)

Buffett Institute of Global Affairs ( email )

1902 Sheridan Road
Evanston, IL
United States

Takashi Uchida

affiliation not provided to SSRN ( email )

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