The Right Ones for the Job: Divining the Correct Standard of Review for Curtilage Determinations in the Aftermath of Ornelas v. United States

University of Chicago Law Review, Vol. 75, p. 885, 2008

26 Pages Posted: 17 Jun 2009

See all articles by Jake Linford

Jake Linford

Florida State University - College of Law

Date Written: June 12, 2009

Abstract

The Fourth Amendment to the Constitution guarantees "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures," and requires that "no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause." Evidence gathered within the curtilage, the "land immediately surrounding and associated with the home," must be gathered in accordance with Fourth Amendment principles, or courts will suppress that evidence at trial. Evidence gathered outside the curtilage is rarely suppressed because it does not fall within the scope of the Fourth Amendment’s protection of houses. Criminal trials thus often turn on where the trial court locates the boundaries of the curtilage.

Currently, the Circuit Courts are split over whether the curtilage determination at trial is a factual finding, subject to deferential clear error review, or a legal value judgment, meriting de novo review. This paper argues that when reviewing curtilage determinations, appellate courts should defer to the findings of the district courts and magistrate judges. Clear error review is consistent with Supreme Court precedent, the common law heritage of the curtilage inquiry, and other areas of decentralized constitutional factfinding. Some courts concluded that de novo review of curtilage determinations is required by Ornelas v. United States, but the Supreme Court’s Ornelas decision actually mandates deferential review, at least when the curtilage determination is made by a magistrate judge at the warrant review stage. Deferential review of curtilage determinations may lead to improved disclosure of police practices at the warrant stage, thereby increasing Fourth Amendment protections of the home and curtilage. Clear error review of curtilage determinations will also promote judicial efficiency, by conserving the resources of the federal appellate courts for inquiries where their relative expertise will more efficiently reduce error.

Historically, curtilage determinations were factual inquiries. In United States v. Dunn, the Supreme Court embraced a common law definition of curtilage. At common law, appellate courts have historically deferred to the curtilage determination of the initial factfinder in burglary cases and murder cases where the defendant invokes the castle defense. The same deference is appropriate in Fourth Amendment curtilage cases, because curtilage determinations are primarily factual inquiries, requiring courts to measure reasonable expectations of privacy as they relate to property boundaries in accordance with local community standards, a fact-based inquiry best suited to courts at the trial level. Thus, de novo review of Fourth Amendment curtilage determinations is a game not worth the candle, particularly in light of the advantages held by local judges when making curtilage determinations.

Keywords: Fourth Amendment, Search and Seizure, Judicial Review

Suggested Citation

Linford, Jake, The Right Ones for the Job: Divining the Correct Standard of Review for Curtilage Determinations in the Aftermath of Ornelas v. United States (June 12, 2009). University of Chicago Law Review, Vol. 75, p. 885, 2008, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1418516

Jake Linford (Contact Author)

Florida State University - College of Law ( email )

425 W. Jefferson St. Ste 322
Tallahassee, FL 32306
United States

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