Exclusive Dealing, Market Shares and the Safe Harbour of Regulation 2790/1999 - Time for a Rethink?

IEJE Working Paper No. 5/2009

19 Pages Posted: 2 Jul 2009

See all articles by Nicolas Petit

Nicolas Petit

European University Institute - Department of Law (LAW)

Marc Abenhaim

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Date Written: March 1, 2009

Abstract

The present paper discusses whether the market share threshold enshrined in Regulation 2790/1999 allows to draw correct inferences on the foreclosure risks arising from single branding and exclusive purchasing obligations in the context of vertical relationships. As far as the customer foreclosure risks arising from single branding are concerned, it comes to the conclusion that Regulation 2790/1999 wrongly focuses on the market share of the seller and should concentrate on the market share of the acquirer. Symetrically, in so far as the input foreclosure risks arising from exclusive purchasing are concerned, Regulation 2790/1999 should focus on the market share of the seller. In the context of the upcoming review of the rules applicable to vertical agreements, the European Commission should seek to address this problem.

Keywords: Vertical agreements, single branding, exclusive purchasing, markets share, threshold, Regulation 2790/1999, foreclosure

Suggested Citation

Petit, Nicolas and Abenhaim, Marc, Exclusive Dealing, Market Shares and the Safe Harbour of Regulation 2790/1999 - Time for a Rethink? (March 1, 2009). IEJE Working Paper No. 5/2009, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1428560 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1428560

Nicolas Petit (Contact Author)

European University Institute - Department of Law (LAW) ( email )

Via Bolognese 156 (Villa Salviati)
50-139 Firenze
Italy

Marc Abenhaim

affiliation not provided to SSRN ( email )

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