House Appropriations After the Republican Revolution

38 Pages Posted: 13 Aug 2009 Last revised: 2 Sep 2009

See all articles by John Aldrich

John Aldrich

Duke University - Department of Political Science

Brittany N. Perry

Duke University - Department of Political Science

David W. Rohde

Duke University - Department of Political Science

Date Written: August 24, 2009

Abstract

This paper applies the theory of “conditional party government” (CPG) to the interaction between the majority party and the Appropriations Committee in the period following the Republican Revolution of 1995. In effort to extend the analysis of Aldrich and Rohde (2000a), we examine how actions within the Committee have changed over time and analyze whether behavior and outcomes continue to match the expectations of CPG. What we find is that under both the Republican majority and the Democratic majority, intra-party cohesion and inter-party conflict remained high. Thus, in both periods, the conditions of the CPG theory continued to be met. As a result, during the entire period following the Republican Revolution, the role of the party remained paramount and the party leadership maintained its influence over the direction of policy. Both the Republican majority and the Democratic majority continued to use the Appropriations Committee as a vehicle for policy change and therefore, during both periods (106th-109th and 110th-present) the party leadership continued to monitor committee actions, blocking policy shifts away from what they wanted and facilitating changes in the desired direction.

Suggested Citation

Aldrich, John and Perry, Brittany N. and Rohde, David W., House Appropriations After the Republican Revolution (August 24, 2009). APSA 2009 Toronto Meeting Paper, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1451207

John Aldrich

Duke University - Department of Political Science ( email )

140 Science Drive (Gross Hall), 2nd floor
Duke University Mailcode: 90204
Durham, NC 27708-0204
United States
919-660-4346 (Phone)

Brittany N. Perry

Duke University - Department of Political Science ( email )

140 Science Drive (Gross Hall), 2nd floor
Duke University Mailcode: 90204
Durham, NC 27708-0204
United States

David W. Rohde (Contact Author)

Duke University - Department of Political Science ( email )

140 Science Drive (Gross Hall), 2nd floor
Duke University Mailcode: 90204
Durham, NC 27708-0204
United States
919-660-7053 (Phone)

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