Aid, Growth and Devolution

37 Pages Posted: 4 Oct 2009

See all articles by Christian Lessmann

Christian Lessmann

Technology University of Braunschweig; Dresden University of Technology - Faculty of Economics and Business Management; Ifo Branch Dresden; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute) - Ifo Institute

Gunther Markwardt

Dresden University of Technology - Faculty of Economics and Business Management

Date Written: September 2009

Abstract

This paper examines whether the federal structure of aid-receiving countries matters in explaining aid effectiveness. Following the decentralization theorem, the devolution of powers should increase aid effectiveness, since local decision-makers are better informed about local needs. At the same time, decentralization has reverse effects, e.g., through coordination problems, excessive regulation, administrative costs and local capture. Using panel data for up to 60 countries, we find that aid is less effective or even harmful in decentralized countries. Our results imply that donor countries should carefully consider how both anti-poverty instruments - financial assistance and decentralization - work together.

Keywords: foreign aid, growth, decentralization

JEL Classification: O10, O20, O40, H70

Suggested Citation

Lessmann, Christian and Markwardt, Gunther, Aid, Growth and Devolution (September 2009). CESifo Working Paper Series No. 2805, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1481150 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1481150

Christian Lessmann

Technology University of Braunschweig ( email )

Abt-Jerusalem-Str. 7
Braunschweig, D-38106
Germany

Dresden University of Technology - Faculty of Economics and Business Management ( email )

Mommsenstrasse 13
Dresden, D-01062
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://www.tu-dresden.de/wwvwlfw

Ifo Branch Dresden ( email )

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, 01069
Germany

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute) - Ifo Institute ( email )

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, 01069
Germany

Gunther Markwardt (Contact Author)

Dresden University of Technology - Faculty of Economics and Business Management ( email )

Mommsenstrasse 13
D-01062 Dresden, Saxony
Germany
++49 (0)351/463-33972 (Phone)

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