Free Riding Problems and Feasible Allocations for Regional Fishery Management Organizations

Pham Do, Kim Hang; Folmer, Henk

doi:10.2139/ssrn.1492469

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Free Riding Problems and Feasible Allocations for Regional Fishery Management Organizations

Massey University Department of Applied and International Economics Discussion Paper No. 06.11

15 Pages Posted: 27 Mar 2011

See all articles by Kim Hang Pham Do

Henk Folmer

University of Groningen

Date Written: October 21, 2009

Abstract

This paper analyzes the free riding problem from a game theoretic point of view. The feasible proportional allocation rules for a special class of free riding problems are studied. Some key practical and theoretical properties of these rules are developed that can be used to stimulate cooperation and to discourage free riding behaviors. Applications to the management of the Baltic Sea cod fishery and the Norwegian herring fishery are presented.

Keywords: games with externalities, feasible allocations, free riding problems, regional sheries management

JEL Classification: A40, A80, B76, B08

Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation

Pham Do, Kim Hang and Folmer, Henk, Free Riding Problems and Feasible Allocations for Regional Fishery Management Organizations (October 21, 2009). Massey University Department of Applied and International Economics Discussion Paper No. 06.11, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1492469 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1492469

Kim Hang Pham Do (Contact Author)

Massey University ( email )

College of Business
School of Economics and Finance
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New Zealand
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