Exclusive Dealing: The Interaction between Foreclosure and Investment Promotion
39 Pages Posted: 11 Jan 2010
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Exclusive Dealing: The Interaction between Foreclosure and Investment Promotion
Exclusive Dealing: The Interaction between Foreclosure and Investment Promotion
Date Written: January 7, 2010
Abstract
This paper studies a model where exclusive dealing (ED) can both promote investment and foreclose a more efficient supplier. While investment promotion is usually regarded as a pro-competitive effect of ED, our paper shows that it may be the very reason why a contract that forecloses a more efficient supplier is signed. Absent the effect on investment, the contract would not be signed and foreclosure would not be a concern. For this reason, considering potential foreclosure and investment promotion in isolation and then summing them up may not be a suitable approach to assess the net effect of ED. The paper therefore invites a more cautious attitude towards accepting possible investment promotion arguments as a defence for ED.
Keywords: Monopolization Practices, Vertical Agreements
JEL Classification: L12, L4, L42
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
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