Accounting for Banks, Capital Regulation, and Risk-Taking

42 Pages Posted: 31 Aug 2009 Last revised: 6 Jun 2018

See all articles by Jing Li

Jing Li

The University of Hong Kong - Faculty of Business and Economics

Date Written: July 1, 2009

Abstract

This paper examines risk-taking incentives in banks under different accounting regimes with capital regulation. In the model the bank's decisions of capital issuance and investment policy are jointly determined. Given some exogenous minimum capital requirement, the bank is more likely to issue equity capital in excess of the minimum required level and implement less risky investment policy under either lower-of-cost-or-market accounting or fair value accounting than under historical cost accounting. But fair value accounting may induce more risk-taking compared to lower-of-cost-or- market accounting due to short-term interest on the part of the bank. However, the disciplining role of lower-of-cost-or-market accounting may discourage bank from exerting project discovery effort ex-ante. From the regulator's perspective, the optimal accounting choice will be governed by a tradeoff between the social cost of capital regulation and the efficiency of the bank's project discovery efforts. When the former effect dominates, the regulator prefers lower-of-cost-or-market accounting; when the latter effect dominates, the regulator may prefer other regimes.

Keywords: Fair value accounting, bank risk-taking, capital regulation

JEL Classification: M41, G21

Suggested Citation

Li, Jing, Accounting for Banks, Capital Regulation, and Risk-Taking (July 1, 2009). AAA 2010 Financial Accounting and Reporting Section (FARS) Paper, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1463101 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1463101

Jing Li (Contact Author)

The University of Hong Kong - Faculty of Business and Economics ( email )

Pokfulam Road
Hong Kong
China

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