Identification of Voters with Interest Groups Improves the Electoral Chances of the Challenger
24 Pages Posted: 16 Apr 2010
Date Written: April 2010
Abstract
Interest groups are introduced in a spatial model of electoral competition between two political parties. We show that, by coordinating voting behavior, these interest groups increase the winning set, which is defined as the set of policy platforms for the challenger that will defeat the incumbent. Therefore interest groups enhance the probability of the challenger winning the election.
Keywords: spatial voting models, electoral competition, winning set, interest groups
JEL Classification: D71, D72
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Sadiraj, Vjollca and Tuinstra, Jan and Van Winden, F. A. A. M., Identification of Voters with Interest Groups Improves the Electoral Chances of the Challenger (April 2010). CESifo Working Paper Series No. 3014, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1590164 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1590164
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