Honesty in Managerial Reporting: Is it Affected by Perceptions of Horizontal Equity?
30 Pages Posted: 31 Jul 2007 Last revised: 12 May 2010
Date Written: May 12, 2010
Abstract
This study examines whether changes in salary and the horizontal equity of salary influence the degree of honesty in managerial reporting. The study makes a unique contribution by examining whether changes in honesty are different when they are in response to changes in an individual’s own salary than when they are in response to changes in the salary of his peers. The results showed that when horizontal equity was increased by increasing participant salary, (with peer salary held constant) the change in honesty was significantly different than when horizontal equity was increased by decreasing peer salary (with participant salary held constant). However, when horizontal equity was decreased, the effect on honesty was about the same, whether the decrease was accomplished by decreasing participant salary or increasing peer salary. The study also showed that after controlling for effects associated with experience with the task and participants’ own salary changes, perceived changes in the horizontal equity of participants’ salary (measured by responses on a post-experiment questionnaire) were positively associated with changes in the degree of honesty in managerial reporting. In short, the results suggest that individuals make tradeoffs among preferences for wealth, honesty, and horizontal equity, and that firms seeking to exploit honesty preferences should attempt to avoid the introduction of inequity.
Keywords: equity, fairness, honesty, participative budgeting, experiment
JEL Classification: M40, M46, J33
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Do you have negative results from your research you’d like to share?
Recommended Papers
-
Incentives and Prosocial Behavior
By Roland Bénabou and Jean Tirole
-
Incentives and Prosocial Behavior
By Roland Bénabou and Jean Tirole
-
Incentives and Prosocial Behavior
By Roland Bénabou and Jean Tirole
-
Do Incentive Contracts Crowd Out Voluntary Cooperation?
By Ernst Fehr and Simon Gächter
-
Do Incentive Contracts Crowd Out Voluntary Cooperation?
By Ernst Fehr and Simon Gächter
-
Psychological Foundations of Incentives
By Ernst Fehr and Armin Falk
-
Psychological Foundations of Incentives
By Armin Falk and Ernst Fehr
-
Do Incentive Contracts Undermine Voluntary Cooperation?
By Ernst Fehr and Simon Gächter
-
The Hidden Costs and Returns of Incentives - Trust and Trustworthiness Among CEOS
By Ernst Fehr and John A. List
-
Honesty in Managerial Reporting
By John Evans, R. Lynn Hannan, ...