An Economic Analysis of the Regulation of Professions

Maks, J.A.H.; Philipsen, Niels J.

An Economic Analysis of the Regulation of Professions

Maks, J.A.H. & Philipsen, N.J., "An Economic Analysis of the Regulation of Professions", in Crals, E. & Vereeck, L., Regulation of Architects in Belgium and The Netherlands, Tielt: Lannoo Campus, 2005, pp. 11-45

18 Pages Posted: 31 Mar 2018

See all articles by J.A.H. Maks

J.A.H. Maks

Independent

Niels J. Philipsen

Maastricht University - Faculty of Law, Metro

Date Written: 2005

Abstract

The economic analysis in this paper is based on two different approaches towards regulation: the public interest and private interest (public choice) approach. The costs and benefits of regulatory solutions to market failure are discussed, focusing on information regulation, quality standards and prior approval. A separate section discusses self-regulation as an alternative to public regulation. Note: another chapter in this book applies this theory to the market for architects.

Keywords: Competition, Regulation, Information asymmetry, Professions

JEL Classification: K21, K23, L51

Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation

Maks, J.A.H. and Philipsen, N. J., An Economic Analysis of the Regulation of Professions (2005). Maks, J.A.H. & Philipsen, N.J., "An Economic Analysis of the Regulation of Professions", in Crals, E. & Vereeck, L., Regulation of Architects in Belgium and The Netherlands, Tielt: Lannoo Campus, 2005, pp. 11-45, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1631685