Who Guards the Guardian?: Towards Regulation of the UN Security Council’s Chapter VII Powers Through Dialogue

SANCTIONS, ACCOUNTABILITY, AND GOVERNANCE IN A GLOBALISED WORLD, Jeremy Farrall & Kim Rubenstein, eds., Cambridge University Press, 2009

ANU College of Law Research Paper No. 10-52

21 Pages Posted: 4 Aug 2010 Last revised: 24 Aug 2010

See all articles by Hitoshi Nasu

Hitoshi Nasu

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Date Written: 2009

Abstract

This chapter addresses the question of how the supremacy of the Rule of Law can be sustained in relation to the Security Council acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.

Since the 1990s, recourse to Chapter VII has become a commonplace and unchallenged practice of the Council, furnishing a wide range of flexible grounds for justifying its actions. The highly political nature of the body influenced largely by the five permanent members (P-5) in combination with the discretionary use of Chapter VII powers has allowed the Council to expand its scope of activities whenever the political hurdle of the veto can be overcome. The chapter examines conventional review mechanisms - political accountability and judicial review -, showing their constraints in controlling Chapter VII powers. An alternative mechanism is proposed with a view to fostering communities of dialogue based on the concept of ‘regulatory conversation’ in an attempt to complement the two conventional methods of control by filling the gap with the development of legal accountability.

Suggested Citation

Nasu, Hitoshi, Who Guards the Guardian?: Towards Regulation of the UN Security Council’s Chapter VII Powers Through Dialogue (2009). SANCTIONS, ACCOUNTABILITY, AND GOVERNANCE IN A GLOBALISED WORLD, Jeremy Farrall & Kim Rubenstein, eds., Cambridge University Press, 2009 , ANU College of Law Research Paper No. 10-52, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1652496

Hitoshi Nasu (Contact Author)

affiliation not provided to SSRN

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