The Market for Lawyers and the Quality of Legal Services

Iossa, Elisabetta; Jullien, Bruno

doi:10.2139/ssrn.1653919

Download This Paper

Open PDF in Browser

Add Paper to My Library

The Market for Lawyers and the Quality of Legal Services

CEIS Working Paper No. 170

45 Pages Posted: 6 Aug 2010

See all articles by Elisabetta Iossa

Elisabetta Iossa

University of Rome Tor Vergata; IEFE Bocconi University; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Bruno Jullien

University of Toulouse 1 - Toulouse School of Economics (TSE); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Date Written: July 2010

Abstract

Studying the strategic interaction between litigants, lawyers and judges, we analyze the value of the quality of legal representation and how public information over quality affects the outcome of the judicial process. Judges have reputational concerns and the quality of lawyers is reflected in knowledge of legal principles and in proof-taking ability. Deriving the demand for legal representation and the market equilibrium, we show that higher quality of legal representation is welfare increasing but better information over quality may be welfare reducing. We discuss the implications of our results on the desirability of quality ceritfication, such as the Queen's Counselor system.

Keywords: Carrer Concerns, Decision Bias, Market for Lawyers

JEL Classification: D82, K40

Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation

Iossa, Elisabetta and Jullien, Bruno, The Market for Lawyers and the Quality of Legal Services (July 2010). CEIS Working Paper No. 170, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1653919 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1653919