The Crisis as a Wake-Up Call: Do Banks Tighten Screening and Monitoring During a Financial Crisis‘
35 Pages Posted: 17 Feb 2009 Last revised: 10 Oct 2011
Date Written: July 2010
Abstract
To what extent was the credit contraction during the global financial crisis due to more intense screening and monitoring by banks‘ We address this question by analyzing changes in the structure of a large number of syndicated loans to private, non-financial corporations. We find an increase in retention rates among syndicate arrangers during the crisis that we cannot explain by borrower risk or interbank liquidity alone. This increased ‘skin in the game’ is especially pronounced when information asymmetries between the borrower and the lending syndicate – or within the syndicate – are high. This indicates that the reduction in bank lending during the crisis was at least partly caused by stricter bank screening and monitoring: a wake-up call.
Keywords: bank lending, financial crisis, loan retention, screening and monitoring, syndication
JEL Classification: D82, G15, G21
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
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