Monetary Rules and the Spillover of Regional Fiscal Policies in a Federation

Abstract

This paper studies the effects of monetary policy rules in a fiscal federation, such as the European Union. The focus of the analysis is the interaction between the fiscal policy of member countries (regions) and the monetary authority. Each of the countries structures its fiscal policy (spending and taxes) with the interests of its citizens in mind. Ricardian equivalence does not hold due to the presence of monetary frictions, modelled here as reserve requirements. When capital markets are integrated, the fiscal policy of one country influences equilibrium wages and interest rates. Under certain rules, monetary policy may respond to the price variations induced by regional fiscal policies. Depending on the type of rule it adopts, interventions by the monetary authority affect the magnitude and nature of the spillover from regional fiscal policy.

Keywords: Monetary Union, Inflation tax, Seigniorage, monetary rules, public debt

JEL Classification: E31, E42, E58, E62