Sending Information to Interactive Receivers Playing a Generalized Prisoners Dilemma

Brown University Economics Working Paper

21 Pages Posted: 17 Oct 2010

Date Written: October 10, 2010

Abstract

Consider the problem of information disclosure for a planner who faces two agents interacting in a state-dependent multi-action prisoners' dilemma. We find conditions under which the planner can make use of his superior information by disclosing some of it to the agents, and conditions under which such information leakage is not possible. Although the problem is entirely symmetric, the planner's only way to reveal part of the information is based on creating asymmetries between the two agents by giving them different pieces of information. We also find conditions under which such partially informative equilibria are the planner's best equilibria.

Keywords: Information Disclosure, Generalized Prisoners' Dilemma, Uninformative Equilibria

JEL Classification: C72, D82, D83

Suggested Citation

Eliaz, Kfir and Serrano, Roberto, Sending Information to Interactive Receivers Playing a Generalized Prisoners Dilemma (October 10, 2010). Brown University Economics Working Paper, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1692093 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1692093

Kfir Eliaz (Contact Author)

Brown University ( email )

Economics Dept.
Box B
Providence, RI 02912
United States
401-863-2112 (Phone)
401-863-1970 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.econ.brown.edu/fac/Kfir_Eliaz/

Roberto Serrano

Brown University ( email )

64 Waterman Street
Providence, RI 02912
United States
401-863-1036 (Phone)
401-863-1970 (Fax)

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