Legal and Market Uncertainty in Market-Based Instruments: The Case of the EU ETS

32 Pages Posted: 1 May 2010 Last revised: 10 Aug 2015

See all articles by Giuseppe Dari‐Mattiacci

Giuseppe Dari‐Mattiacci

University of Amsterdam; Tinbergen Institute; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Josephine A. W. van Zeben

Wageningen University and Research

Date Written: April 26, 2010

Abstract

‘Legal uncertainty’ is the uncertainty experienced by the parties to a lawsuit with respect to the outcome of litigation. When the consequences of a judgment extend to third parties, legal uncertainty can spread into markets and become ‘market uncertainty’. Thus, market uncertainty has relevant and pervasive consequences not only for the litigants but also for unrelated third parties. We argue that certain types of legal remedies cause the transformation from legal uncertainty into market uncertainty. This problem is particular to ‘artificial markets’, such as those created by the legislator for the purposes of marketbased regulation, e.g. the European Union Emission Trading System (“EU ETS”). Specifically, market uncertainty is a likely consequence of the use of restitutio in integrum (a property-rule remedy) as opposed to the use of damages (a liability-rule remedy). Recent litigation within the EU ETS provides a clear example of both the mechanisms of transmission of legal uncertainty to the market and of its causes. We identify the costs of letting legal uncertainty turn into market uncertainty and examine possible solutions to this problem.

Keywords: Legal uncertainty, economic uncertainty, market uncertainty, market-based regulation, property rules, liability rules, European Union Emissions Trading System

JEL Classification: D80, K20, K32, K40

Suggested Citation

Dari-Mattiacci, Giuseppe and van Zeben, Josephine A. W., Legal and Market Uncertainty in Market-Based Instruments: The Case of the EU ETS (April 26, 2010). NYU Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 19, No. 1, 2011, Amsterdam Center for Law & Economics Working Paper No. 2010-02, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1596016 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1596016

Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci (Contact Author)

University of Amsterdam ( email )

Postbus 15654
1001 ND
Amsterdam, Noord-Holland 1001 ND
Netherlands

Tinbergen Institute ( email )

Burg. Oudlaan 50
Rotterdam, 3062 PA
Netherlands

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )

c/o the Royal Academies of Belgium
Rue Ducale 1 Hertogsstraat
1000 Brussels
Belgium

Josephine A. W. Van Zeben

Wageningen University and Research ( email )

Hollandseweg 1
Wageningen, 6706KN
Netherlands

Do you have negative results from your research you’d like to share?

Paper statistics

Downloads
311
Abstract Views
1,715
Rank
178,035
PlumX Metrics