The Robustness of Robust Implementation
15 Pages Posted: 22 Dec 2010
Date Written: June 22, 2010
Abstract
We show that a mechanism that robustly implements optimal outcomes in a one-dimensional supermodular environment continues to robustly implement ε-optimal outcomes in all close-by environments. Robust implementation of ε-optimal outcomes is thus robust to small perturbations of the environment. This is in contrast to ex-post implementation which is not robust in this sense as only trivial social choice functions are ex-post implementable in generic environments.
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