Neil MacCormick on Interpretation, Defeasibility, and the Rule of Law

Abstract

The paper examines and critically reflects on Neil MacCormick’s theory of legal reasoning, and more specifically with his theory of interpretation. To begin with, I will try to summarize the main tenets of MacCormick’s theory of legal interpretation; I will then move on to consider a specific interpretive problem, that is the place of defeasibility in law. Lastly, I will try to put these ideas in the context of MacCormick’s ideas on the Rule of law. The perspective of the examination is diachronical in character: I will try to highlight what seems to me a substantial evolution of MacCormick’s ideas on these topics, and to put this evolution in the broader context of MacCormick’s position within the jurisprudential camp.

Keywords: MacCormick, interpretation, defeasibility, Rule of Law