The Housing Market Effects of Discrete Land Use Regulations: Evidence from the California Coastal Boundary Zone

11 Pages Posted: 10 Feb 2011

See all articles by Matthew E. Kahn

Matthew E. Kahn

University of Southern California; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Ryan Vaughn

University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA)

Jonathan Zasloff

University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) - School of Law

Date Written: February 8, 2011

Abstract

The California coast line borders most beautiful and expensive land in the entire world. The California Coastal Commission was created in 1976 to protect the coast line and to regulate land use within the coastal boundary zone. This well defined regulatory boundary offers a unique opportunity to study the consequences of land use regulation on nearby housing located in the same political jurisdiction. Using two different geocoded data sets, we document gentrification within the boundary and discuss possible explanations for these patterns.

Keywords: land use regulations, housing markets, environmental protection, California Coastal Act of 1976

Suggested Citation

Kahn, Matthew E. and Vaughn, Ryan and Zasloff, Jonathan, The Housing Market Effects of Discrete Land Use Regulations: Evidence from the California Coastal Boundary Zone (February 8, 2011). Journal of Housing Economics, Vol. 19, pp. 269-279, December 2010, UCLA School of Law Research Paper No. 11-04, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1758096

Matthew E. Kahn

University of Southern California ( email )

2250 Alcazar Street
Los Angeles, CA 90089
United States

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Ryan Vaughn

University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) ( email )

405 Hilgard Avenue
Box 951361
Los Angeles, CA 90095
United States

Jonathan Zasloff (Contact Author)

University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) - School of Law ( email )

385 Charles E. Young Dr. East
Room 1242
Los Angeles, CA 90095-1476
United States

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