Don’t Be Ashamed to Say You Didn’t Get Much: Redistributive Effects of Information Disclosure in Donations and Inequity-Aversion in Charitable Giving

AICCON Working Paper No. 88

45 Pages Posted: 24 Jun 2011

See all articles by Leonardo Becchetti

Leonardo Becchetti

University of Rome Tor Vergata - Faculty of Economics

Vittorio Pelligra

Universita di Cagliari - Department of Economic and Social Sciences

Date Written: May 20, 2011

Abstract

We run a modified dictator game experiment to investigate the determinants of donation choices to philanthropic organizations. We find experimentally that the adoption of a simple form of accountability such as the disclosure of information on the ranking of aggregate contributions received by the organizations has important redistributive effects on donations, leading donors to reallocate their giving significantly from top to bottom performers. Our findings support the hypothesis that individuals have preferences on total donations and their ideal distribution, and not just on their own giving. Policy consequences of our findings in terms of public and private contribution disclosure rules are discussed.

Keywords: altruism, strategic information, charitable-giving

JEL Classification: C91, D64, H00

Suggested Citation

Becchetti, Leonardo and Pelligra, Vittorio, Don’t Be Ashamed to Say You Didn’t Get Much: Redistributive Effects of Information Disclosure in Donations and Inequity-Aversion in Charitable Giving (May 20, 2011). AICCON Working Paper No. 88, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1858245 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1858245

Leonardo Becchetti

University of Rome Tor Vergata - Faculty of Economics ( email )

Via Columbia, 2
I-00133 Rome
Italy

Vittorio Pelligra (Contact Author)

Universita di Cagliari - Department of Economic and Social Sciences ( email )

V. S. Ignazio 17
Cagliari 09123, CA 09123
Italy

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