Higher Order Expectations, Illiquidity, and Short-Term Trading

69 Pages Posted: 1 Aug 2011

See all articles by Giovanni Cespa

Giovanni Cespa

Bayes Business School; Bayes Business School; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Xavier Vives

University of Navarra - IESE Business School; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research)

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Date Written: July 27, 2011

Abstract

When trading frequencies between liquidity traders and short term, heterogeneously informed investors differ, asset prices reflect Higher Order Expectations (HOEs) about both fundamentals and liquidity trading, and multiple, self-fulfilling equilibria arise. Differential information and heterogeneous trading frequencies make illiquidity dependent on a coordination problem across generations of investors and generate liquidity risk. If asset prices are driven by HOEs about fundamentals, they heavily rely on public information and the market displays high illiquidity; if HOEs about fundamentals are subdued, prices rely less on public information and the market displays low illiquidity. Along the equilibrium with low illiquidity, the volume of informational trading is high, and momentum arises at short horizons. Conversely, along the equilibrium with high illiquidity the volume of informational trading is low and short term returns tend to revert. At long horizons reversal occurs.

Keywords: Expected returns, multiple equilibria, liquidity risk, average expectations, reliance on public information, momentum and reversal, Beauty Contest.

JEL Classification: G10, G12, G14

Suggested Citation

Cespa, Giovanni and Cespa, Giovanni and Vives, Xavier, Higher Order Expectations, Illiquidity, and Short-Term Trading (July 27, 2011). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1782742 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1782742

Giovanni Cespa (Contact Author)

Bayes Business School ( email )

106 Bunhill Row
London, EC1Y 8TZ
United Kingdom
+44(0)2040708704 (Phone)

Bayes Business School ( email )

United Kingdom

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) ( email )

London
United Kingdom

Xavier Vives

University of Navarra - IESE Business School ( email )

Avenida Pearson 21
Barcelona, 08034
Spain

HOME PAGE: http://wwwapp.iese.edu/faculty/facultyDetail.asp?lang=en&prof=xv

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research) ( email )

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

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