Enforcement of Contribution Norms in Public Good Games with Heterogeneous Populations
37 Pages Posted: 24 Aug 2011
There are 3 versions of this paper
Enforcement of Contribution Norms in Public Good Games with Heterogeneous Populations
Enforcement of Contribution Norms in Public Good Games with Heterogeneous Populations
Enforcement of Contribution Norms in Public Good Games with Heterogeneous Populations
Date Written: July 1, 2011
Abstract
We investigate the emergence and enforcement of contribution norms to public goods in homogeneous and heterogeneous groups. With survey data we demonstrate that uninvolved individuals hold well defined yet conflicting normative ideas of fair contribution rules related to efficiency, equality, and equity. In the experiment, in the absence of punishment no contribution norm is observed and all groups converge towards free-riding. With punishment, strong and stable differences in contributions emerge across group types and individuals in different roles. In some cases these differences result from the emergence of an absolute efficiency norm where all fully contribute. In the cases where full efficiency is not attained, these differences result from the enforcement of different relative contribution norms. Our experimental data show that individuals often agree on and enforce a contribution norm even when it entails pronounced differences in earnings.
Keywords: public good, heterogeneous groups, punishment, cooperation, social norms, norm enforcement
JEL Classification: H41, C92, D63
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
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