The People’s Regulation: Citizens and Implementation of Law in China

Amsterdam Law School Research Paper No. 2011-22

General Subserie Research Paper No. 2011-03

62 Pages Posted: 31 Aug 2011 Last revised: 4 Sep 2011

See all articles by Benjamin van Rooij

Benjamin van Rooij

University of California, Irvine School of Law; University of Amsterdam - Faculty of Law

Date Written: August 29, 2011

Abstract

This paper discusses how China has made a move towards society-based regulation, enabling citizens to aid in the implementation of regulatory law. It discusses the necessity of this development in the light of the government’s problems in enforcing its laws. The paper contends that citizens have had some success in improving regulatory effects to mitigate risk. However, it also finds that citizen-based regulation reforms have been halfhearted, as existing and recently introduced authoritarian restrictions obstruct citizens and civic organizations to become successful co-regulators. The paper concludes that at its worst China has developed a form of regulation by escalation, where ironically the exact incentive structures for Chinese regulatory and judicial officials to prevent unrest, also provide an incentive for citizens to create instability as a successful strategy to get regulatory law implemented. And thus, China’s halfhearted approach to regulatory governance with its focus on stability may be destabilizing.

Keywords: China, comparative law, law enforcement, regulation, environmental law, labor law

JEL Classification: K23, K42

Suggested Citation

van Rooij, Benjamin and van Rooij, Benjamin, The People’s Regulation: Citizens and Implementation of Law in China (August 29, 2011). Amsterdam Law School Research Paper No. 2011-22, General Subserie Research Paper No. 2011-03 , Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1918935 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1918935

Benjamin Van Rooij (Contact Author)

University of Amsterdam - Faculty of Law ( email )

Amsterdam, 1018 WB
Netherlands

University of California, Irvine School of Law ( email )

401 E. Peltason Dr.
Ste. 1000
Irvine, CA 92697-1000
United States

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