Democratic Conditionality in Eastern Enlargement: Ambitious Window Dressing

Eurpoean Foreign Affairs Review, Vol. 16, 2011, pp. 589-605.

17 Pages Posted: 20 Sep 2011 Last revised: 28 May 2016

See all articles by Eline De Ridder

Eline De Ridder

Ghent University, Centre for EU Studies

Dimitry Kochenov

CEU Democracy Institute, Budapest; CEU Department of Legal Studies, Vienna

Date Written: September 20, 2011

Abstract

This article addresses the promotion of democracy in the enlargement process of the Central and Eastern European countries. We start by outlining EU democracy promotion during accession, with a particular focus on political conditionality. In a subsequent part we argue that the European Commission did not make a clear substantive distinction between the concepts of rule of law and democracy. In addition various drawbacks are identified which demonstrate the vagueness and inconsistencies which characterize the EU’s application of democratic conditionality. A final part illustrates these points by focusing on the EU’s democratic conditionality towards the Czech Republic and Slovakia. The conclusion reads that the EU did not have a well-defined view and approach to the promotion of democracy and the rule of law in the Eastern enlargement.

Keywords: EU, enlargement, democracy, conditionality, rule of law, PHARE, accession, Eastern Europe, Czech Republic, Slovakia, European Commission

Suggested Citation

De Ridder, Eline and Kochenov, Dimitry and Kochenov, Dimitry, Democratic Conditionality in Eastern Enlargement: Ambitious Window Dressing (September 20, 2011). Eurpoean Foreign Affairs Review, Vol. 16, 2011, pp. 589-605., Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1930911

Eline De Ridder

Ghent University, Centre for EU Studies ( email )

Coupure Links 653
Ghent, 9000
Belgium

Dimitry Kochenov (Contact Author)

CEU Democracy Institute, Budapest ( email )

Nador utca 9
Budapest, H-1051
Hungary

CEU Department of Legal Studies, Vienna ( email )

Quellenstraße 51
Vienna, 1100
Austria

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